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Abstract 
 
Nigeria’s relations with South Africa were of double standard during the apartheid era. The post-independence Nigeria and the 
apartheid regime in Pretoria relations were sour and confrontational, while it was friendly between Nigeria and the liberation 
movements in South Africa, especially with the African National Congress (ANC). It was more so because Nigeria adopted 
Africa as the centerpiece of its foreign policy, and committed itself to the total liberation of the African continent from colonialism 
and racism. Nigeria staged untiring opposition to colonialism on the African continent, and the racism that existed in South 
Africa before 1994. The beginning of a new era started in the final days of apartheid in South Africa when President de Klerk 
visited Nigeria in April 1992 to discuss bilateral issues, mostly trade relations. The paper examines, however, Nigeria and 
South Africa’s diplomatic fluidity since re-establishing formal relations in 1994 in order to understand the causes of the 
misunderstanding and the effect on both countries’ relations and suggest better ways to foster their relations. The study argues 
that Nigeria plays big brother roles in Africa from 1960 but is now unable to continue with such big brother projects. South 
Africa on the other hand quickly recognized economic opportunities in Africa and seek to establish neo-imperial post in the 
continent. However, the study suggests that the two African giants can have a smooth relations but Nigeria needs to step up its 
development in order to create parity with South Africa to help them form alliance of strength for Africa. It also notes that South 
Africa is the real giant of Africa, but Nigeria covers her internal weaknesses while engaging in diplomacy, especially with South 
Africa. 
 
Keywords: Diplomatic relations, bilateral relations, General Sani Abacha, Nelson Mandela, democratizing, African renaissance, 
foreign policy in Africa, big brother Nigeria and neo-imperialist south Africa, African giants, yellow fever. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This essay aims at exploring and explaining the two major diplomatic failures between the two most powerful nations in 
Africa, Nigeria and South Africa, since 1994 with the possibility of understanding causes and the effects on the diplomatic 
relations of the two giant nations of Africa. The two countries have the two largest economies in Africa, South Africa 
taking the lead because of her more capitalized economy with advantage in infrastructure, science and technology, while 
Nigeria is the second largest economy in Africa owing to her population and the blessings this most populous black nation 
in the world enjoys in oil as well as human resources (see Marwa, 2010). The state of Nigeria has suffered many years of 
squandering at the hands of her erstwhile military leaders and politicians (Idowu, 2008). This has been a major setback in 
the body politics of Nigeria. 
This essay uses content-analysis based on literature, electronic, and print media to explore the diplomatic 
breakdowns of the two most influential countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Adopting a qualitative method of research, the 
essay describes and analyses the two major diplomatic crises between Nigeria and South Africa. The study uses 
Nigeria’s withdrawal from the 1996 African Cup of Nations hosted by South Africa, and the most recent deportations of 
travelers between the two countries owing to the yellow fever vaccination card scandal to argue that the failure of the two 
countries to form a workable alliance is a setback to their relations and as such have not enhanced productivity in their 
relations. 
One of the reasons for using content-analysis based on secondary data is because the necessary data for the 
examining the diplomatic crises of Nigeria and South Africa is already available in literature, electronic, and print media. 
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Another reason is that it would be impossible to interview the individuals involved in those crises and even if they would 
be met for interviews their views might not be relied upon since they might be biased in their versions of the story. These 
make content-analysis based on secondary data the most suitable methodology for this study.     
 
2. Background to Nigeria-South Africa’s Bilateral Relations Since 1994 
 
The expectations around the world that Nigeria would play a pivotal role in the reviving of Africa after its independent on 1 
October 1960 had diminished to a great extent at the time South Africa re-entered the comity of nations as a democracy 
in the 1994. The only memorable thing left was remembrance of Nigeria’s role in the liberation of Africa from colonialism, 
and the special support she gave to the abolition of apartheid in South Africa (see Aremu, 2013). The diminishing 
influence of Nigeria could be blamed on her economy, which failed largely because of the successive military regimes in 
the country. 
However, the new democratic regime in Pretoria, the popular government of national unity (GNU) led by the anti-
apartheid icon, President Nelson Mandela, quickly established bilateral relations with Nigeria in 1994, though the latter 
was under the military leadership led by late General Sani Abacha. The move was in recognition of Nigeria’s role in the 
liberation of apartheid South Africa. Though the formal relationship was established between Nigeria and South Africa, 
Banjo (2010) remarked that the Mandela-Abacha relationship did not measure up to African expectations because it was 
characterized by mistrust and conflict between the two administrations (also see Aremu, 2013). One of the major issues 
was the demand by President Mandela that Nigeria should democratize in line with the Harare Declaration in 1991 by the 
Commonwealth Heads of State and Government (see Ndlovu, 2010). 
Pretoria’s assumption of moral authority to advise on democracy and the advancement of human rights was based 
on what South Africa had adopted as her pillars of foreign policy after 1994, but was misinterpreted by Nigeria’s military 
junta as an attempt by Pretoria to set up competition between the two countries which Nigeria claimed she was not 
interested in (Banjo, 2010). Nigeria’s side of the argument was in itself a distortion of the facts. For example, military 
involvement in politics was already out of fashion in the world. The relationship between the two countries was tense 
because of Abacha’s desire to hang onto power, and gross abuse of human rights in Nigeria (Banjo, 2010).  
Nigeria had witnessed successive military juntas led by Major-General Mohammadu Buhari which cut short about 
five year old democracy led by President Shehu Shagari. On 27 August 1985 there was another military takeover in 
Nigeria, popularly known as a ‘palace coup’, headed by General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida, the so-called ‘Maradona’ 
of Nigerian politics, who deceived Nigerians with his unfulfilled promises of handover to a democratically elected 
government in early1990s.The transitions were successively postponed, but the end was the unpopular annulment of the 
June 12, 1993 presidential election judged by expert analysts as the most credible election ever to have been held in 
Nigeria (Banjo, 2010). 
Largely because of international and national pressure on the military junta, General Babangida stepped aside and 
installed a weak administration popularly known as the Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, 
who was sworn in as Nigeria’s ninth head of state. The move was to the amazement of Nigeria and the world as the 
choice was not the self-proclaimed winner of the June 12 presidential election, Chief M. K. Abiola. The ING was generally 
viewed as lacking a popular mandate, it were not surprise that the ING had lasted for barely three months when on 17 
November 1993 the then Head of State claimed to have resigned. In fact it was yet another coup d’état in Nigeria (Banjo, 
2010). The only thing that looked different from the previous coups was the mild nature of the military takeover; but that 
could be attributed to the weakness of the ING. The government was largely regarded as illegitimate in view of the 
circumstances that had brought it to power.   
The leader of the new military regime in Nigeria was General Sani Abacha, who announced the suspension of all 
democratic structures and activities as usual with military leadership but to public dismay, constitutional provisions were 
quickly replaced by arbitrary decrees, which paved the way for the junta to embark on gross human rights abuses in 
disregard of the judiciary. The regime soon faced unprecedented opposition from human rights groups and crusaders for 
democracy because Abacha was seen by many as an insider of the Babangida’s military junta, who could only extend 
Babangida’s agenda in the Aso-rock (Abuja), Nigeria’s sit of power. Ababach’s response in the face of opposition was 
use of brutal force through the State security apparatus. Banjo (2010) summed it up when he wrote that the military 
government was characterized by extrajudicial killings, assassinations, and torture by the state security, the abrogation of 
civil liberties, and the curtailment of political and labour affiliation. Nigeria at this stage entered into one of the worst 
stages of human rights abuse of its history. 
General Sani Abacha’s resolve to remain in power instead of democratizing further aggravated the poor human 
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rights situation in the country as he went on to arrest and detain, Chief M. K. Abiola who was widely known as the winner 
of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. President Nelson Mandela, who had ascended to a position of international 
personality, visited Nigeria in 1995 to plead for the release of Abiola (Banjo, 2010). Banjo identified three major sources 
of pressure on President Mandela: President Clinton’s administration in the US, African leaders, and Abiola’s family and 
supporters. The Nigerian government downplayed the Mandela visit as merely a solidarity visit which South African 
diplomatic sources disputed and blamed Abacha as the man who was plunging Nigeria into political crises assessed to 
be similar to what had happened in Rwanda (Banjo, 2010) . 
At this stage Mandela’s growing international prestige brought more pressure on him from Western and African 
leaders in both non-governmental and governmental institutions to step up initiatives that would resolve the Nigerian 
crisis and secure the release of Abiola. Mandela took a further step by sending the renowned South African Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to Abuja in April 1995. The move still did not yield any result as Abacha did 
not promise anything, and Tutu reported back to Mandela that his attempt was fruitless. However, he advised that 
Mandela should consult further with Abacha (Banjo, 2010). 
In another poor move of the military junta, a group of purported coup plotters who were suspected of  plotting to 
overthrow the Abacha regime were arrested, the most prominent of whom were General Olusegun Obasanjo (former 
Nigerian head of state), and Major-General Shehu Musa Yar’ Adua. Mandela yet again made significant effort to 
intervene by sending his deputy president, Thabo Mbeki to Nigeria in July 1995. The move was a calculated attempt by 
Mandela to capitalize on the diplomatic experience of his able deputy who had negotiated so much for the ANC during 
the apartheid struggle. He had also been the ANC’s representative in Nigeria between 1976 and 1978 at a time Obasanjo 
was Nigeria’s military head of state. Mbeki’s three-day working visit did not bear fruit because Abacha made no promise 
to release Abiola and other important political detainees (Banjo, 2010). 
During the Commonwealth summit in Auckland, Mandela’s conviction that he had received General Sani Abacha’s 
firm promise of clemency for the ‘Ogoni nine’ (Ken Sarowiwa and eight others) was to no effect when he learnt of their 
sudden execution. Mandela felt betrayed because of his assurance to fellow Commonwealth leaders that the executions 
would not take effect. He believed he had used his moral stature to discourage Abacha from carrying out the hangings, 
and angrily accused Abacha of behaving like a frightened dictator who engaged in extra-judicial killings (Banjo, 2010). He 
concurred with the British premier, John Major that Abacha was sitting on a volcano and he promised to explode it under 
him. He called on the West to impose oil sanctions on Abacha’s regime, and advocated Nigeria’s expulsion from the 
Commonwealth (Adebajo, 2007). This simply meant a switch of position between Nigeria and South Africa. In the 
apartheid days, Nigeria had successfully championed the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth, which was 
successful and held until the end of apartheid (Arema, 2013). 
On his return home, Mandela recalled his High Commissioner to Nigeria, George Nene, who had been somewhat 
heavily criticized by South African civil society groups for failing to make contact with Nigerian opposition groups, and 
being close to unscrupulous leaders in Abuja. Nigerian leaders felt otherwise – that Nene had become too close to the 
opposition, and had lost all understanding with the Abacha led government in Abuja (Adebajo, 2007) 
 
2.1 Nigeria Withdraws from 1996 African Cup of Nations 
 
In December 1995, Mandela called on SADC summit to take collective action against Nigeria on the grounds of human 
rights abuse and indiscriminate extrajudicial killing. According to Banjo and Omidiran, (2000), Abacha responded by 
refusing to let the Nigerian Super Eagles defend their African Cup of Nations gold medal (which the Nigerian team had 
won in 1994 in Tunis) in South Africa in 1996. In Nigeria’s calculation, the first indication that South Africa intended to use 
sports as a weapon was when South Africa withdrew the invitation of Nigeria’s Super Eagles to the four-nation 
tournament organized by South Africa. The South African Football Association alleged that it was because of the hanging 
of the ‘Ogoni 9’ that the invitation was withdrawn. The Nigerian sports authorities protested to FIFA asking for South 
Africa to be punished for mixing sport with politics. Nigeria based her argument on the ground that suspension of Nigeria 
from the Commonwealth because of the killing of the ‘Ogoni 9’ was a political issue which should not have influenced 
sports decisions. FIFA agreed but only warned South Africa, promising, however, to punish her if there were any future 
occurrence of mixture of sport and politics (Banjo and Omidiran, 2000). 
Nigeria, a master specialist in using sport to advance political interest, recalled that CAF 1996 in South Africa 
provided an ample opportunity for her to outsmart South Africa in this time of diplomatic breakdown between the two 
countries. This would be similar to the positions that Nigeria had taken on sport to score political points against the 
apartheid regime. Chief Tom Ikimi, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister who was also the former Chairman of the defunct 
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National Republican Convention (NRC), one of the political parties that contested elections in Nigeria’s failed third 
republic, wanted success in defending the worst Nigerian notorious regime around the world (Banjo and Omidiran, 2000). 
He was said to have presented a shabby and highly contested report of the hostile attitude South Africa promised 
Nigeria’s team, sports officials and supporters if they dared come to South Africa in 1996. The main thrust of the report 
which was obtained from Nigeria’s High Commission in South Africa was that there would be no Nigerian representatives 
in the competition (Banjo and Omidiran, 2000). The South African decision to deny Nigeria’s then Minister of Sport, Chief 
Jim Nwaobodo a visa constituted evidence, though under CAF and FIFA rules South Africa was not obliged to issue visas 
to officials of a sports ministry but only to players, fans, and officials of Football Associations (Banjo and Omidiran, 2000). 
However, refusal of visa application to such a high profile Nigerian was not acceptable to the leadership  
The situation was further aggravated by Nigeria’s Minister of Information, Walter Ofonagoro’s, accusation of 
Nelson Mandela of being a black head of a white country’ who could not be trusted. Adebajo (2007) observed that it was 
a particularly hurtful and insensitive statement that hit at the most sensitive spot of a black-led government that had 
inherited a country in which whites still controlled the economy and economic institutions. Continuing, he explained that 
ordinary South Africans would not easily forgive Nigeria for this personal slur on the country’s saintly hero. Mandela’s 
inexperience in the complexities of African diplomacy was shown in his inability, despite his iconic status, to acquire a 
single Southern African state to take action against Nigeria.  
In the end, Nigeria boycotted the 1996 CAF competition in South Africa (Banjo, 2010). This was clearly a situation 
that could have been managed better if not for the misuse of words on the part of South Africa who was so much 
dependent upon the personality and moral status of its President. Nigeria on its part was pretending that all was well with 
its internal politics and the military leaders in Nigeria miscalculated by expressing that Nigeria’s relations with South Africa 
should only be defined by its contribution to the peaceful end of apartheid. Both countries undermined real issues in 
foreign policy.   
 
2.2 The Revival of Relations Between Nigeria and South Africa 
 
In June 1998 General Sani Abacha’s untimely death seemed to have turned events around between the two countries. 
The South African Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, travelled to Nigeria to urge the newly appointed head of state, 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar, to release political prisoners, protect human rights, and ensure press freedom and turn 
on the green light for safe return of exiles (Banjo, 2010). In August the same year, General Abdulsalami Abubakar 
returned the visit. Abubakar also extended an invitation to President Nelson Mandela to the ECOWAS summit to be 
hosted in Abuja, Nigeria. These moves paved the way for the revival of cooperation between the two countries (Banjo, 
2010). The gentle Abubakar handed over to a democratically elected government on 29 May 1999, imitating President de 
Klerk who had earlier in 1994 piloted the transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. Interestingly, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, who succeeded General Abubakar, would on his first foreign trip as democratically elected President 
of Nigeria attend the inauguration of his friend, Thabo Mbeki, as President of South Africa in June of the same year. 
Not long after, improvement of relations between the two countries was to depend largely on the Binational 
Commission which was a strategic coordination of economic bilateralism between the two countries. The commission 
was formally established in October 1999, to be co-chaired by the Vice-President and Deputy President of Nigeria and 
South Africa respectively (Banjo, 2010). According to Adebajo, (2007), the Binational Commission has major objectives 
which he highlighted as being to provide a framework for joint efforts to bring Africa into the mainstream of global political, 
social, and economic developments; provide the basis for the government and private sectors of both countries to consult 
with each other to promote bilateral trade and industry; improve bilateral relations in the fields of technology, education, 
health, culture, youth, and sports; use both countries’ human and natural resources to maximize socio-economic 
development through collaborative efforts; and establish the mechanisms to promote peace, stability, and socio-economic 
integration in Africa. According to Adebajo, (2007), Nigeria and South Africa held six BNC meetings, alternating them 
between the two countries. Those meetings were held in October 1999, April 2000, March 2001, March 2002, December 
2003 and September 2004.  
According to Adebajo, (2007), the BNC intended to address some issues that have negatively affected the 
relationship between Tshwane and Abuja including Nigerian diplomats complaining about negative South African press 
reports and xenophobic stereotypes depicting Nigerians as drug traffickers and criminals. Nigerian diplomats contend that 
local South Africans, Chinese, Asians, Europeans and Arabs are also engaged in the illegal business of drug dealing, but 
they are not tarred with it. A Johannesburg radio station, 94.7 Highveld, was forced by South Africa’s Broadcasting 
Complaints Commission to apologize after it claimed that the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, was carrying 
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cocaine in his bag when he came to attend Mbeki’s inauguration in June 2004 (Adebajo, 2007). In spite of the framework 
of BNC and numerous bilateral agreements Nigeria has signed with South Africa, the two countries have not been able to 
maintain absolute cordial diplomatic relation. There have also been minor sporadic diplomatic breakdowns between the 
two countries, but another worrisome crisis broke out in 2012 popularly known as yellow fever card deportation. 
 
2.3 Yellow Fever Card Deportation 
 
Another major diplomatic row erupted between Nigeria and South Africa, with the former alleging that President Jacob 
Zuma's led government was ‘taking decisions that were disrespectful to Africa. This was as a result of the deportation of 
125 Nigerians who landed at OR Tambo International Airport. On 5 March, 2012 the group was prevented from entering 
South Africa because they did not have the required documentation for vaccination against yellow fever as required by 
South African port health authorities. Reports showed that 75 of them were sent back home via South African Airways, 
and another 50 were flown back by the Nigerian airline, Arik Air (Moeng, 2012). 
The Soweto reported that Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Gbenga Ashiru, vowed to reciprocate the gesture by 
demonstrating that South Africa does not have a monopoly in deporting travelers. In a surprise move, described by many 
as retaliatory, 28 South Africans were turned back at Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos, and another 56 
were deported between 6th and 7th of March 2012. After six days of diplomatic stand-off, a total of 256 nationals of both 
powerhouses, Nigeria and South Africa, were carelessly deported to their respective countries without due process. 
Nigeria this time took a pound of South Africa’s flesh by deporting a total of 131 South Africans (Moeng, 2012). According 
to The Sowetan, the South African International Relations and Cooperation Department’s spokesman, Clayson Monyela, 
claimed that Nigeria was blowing things out of proportion and mixing issues. The Department further stated that it was a 
health matter, claiming that it was only being elevated to a diplomatic issue by Nigeria (Moeng, 2012).  
According to The Sowetan, the South African Department of Home Affair’s spokesperson, Ronnie Mamoepa, also 
claimed that the Department followed standard international protocol in the deportation. He advised the public to 
understand that communicable diseases must be controlled. The spokesperson of the Department of health, Fidel 
Hadebe, was of the opinion that South Africa was in line with the country’s policies, which are also in line with WHO 
(World Health Organization) guidelines on disease control.  
However, a gentleman’s agreement was reached after the South African government formally sent a letter of 
apology to Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olugbenga Ashiru, apologizing for barring 125 Nigerians from entry into 
South Africa over alleged possession of fake yellow fever vaccine cards. Nigeria in turn accepted the apology of the 
supposedly guilty opponent, South Africa. According to The Sowetan, both countries decided to put in place certain 
mechanisms to ensure that a similar development does not reoccur. The intention was to protect the bilateral relations 
and agreements between the two countries. The five measures Nigeria and South Africa agreed upon included: 
• The revival of the Binational Commission between South Africa and Nigeria and the Immigration Working 
Group as soon as possible. 
• South Africa’s national Department of Health and the Gauteng Health Department to reconsider reopening the 
vaccination clinic at the OR Tambo International Airport so that passengers without the yellow fever card can 
be vaccinated upon arrival at the airport to avoid undue deportation. 
• The South African and Nigerian health authorities would exchange vaccine batch numbers and details about 
the official institutions that administer the vaccine for verification purposes at the port of entry. This information 
would also be made available to the missions in Lagos and Abuja who issue visas based on the proof of a 
yellow fever certificate. The airlines will also be informed about the verification process.  
• Immigration officials would be the first officials that deal with the travelers at the port of entry, and if they 
should experience challenges, they should invite other units such as Health to help, and not the other way 
round. 
• In the case of mass deportations, senior officials at the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation, including Protocol, should be consulted by Immigration and Health officials at the airport before 
undertaking such action. This will provide opportunity to senior officials to consult with the Department before 
deportation of large numbers of people. 
 
3. The African Giants 
 
According to Ajaebili (2011), the core principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy as generally agreed upon by scholars include: 
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a. The Principle of Non-Alignment: This is a rejection of alliance with the existing ideological and military power 
blocs of the capitalist West led by the United States and the communist East led by the former Soviet Union 
during the cold war era. It was particularly important because Nigeria gained independence during the heat of 
cold war.  
b. Legal Equality of States: Nigeria adopted the principle of respect for the legal equality, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states, big or small. This was designed to protect the small and newly independent 
states from the domineering influence of the developed nations.  
c. Non Interference in the Domestic Affairs of other state: Nigeria upheld the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries.  
d. The Principle of Multilateralism: This implies the freedom to seek membership of both continental and global 
multilateral organizations.  
e. Africa as the Centre piece of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Africa has remained the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy since independence 
It is generally accepted that a vibrant foreign policy derives its strength from domestic imperatives, that is, from the 
needs of the country and the populace. Africa has remained the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy since 
independence in 1960 (Ajaebili, 2011). The country has therefore spent heavily in pursuit of the decolonization of Africa 
and terminating the apartheid regime in Pretoria, aggressively championing the freedom of Africans in various countries 
such as Congo, Angola and Mozambique when they were under the yoke of colonialism, and of others under the minority 
racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa (Ajaebili, 2011). 
Nigeria has played an unmatchable role in restoring peace to conflict-ridden African countries such as Congo, 
Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Ajaebili, 2011), to which she always committed huge human and material resources. 
Nigeria has, however, continued to endure the mockery of several African states notwithstanding her big brother role in 
Africa. For instance, some neighbouring Francophone countries embarrass Nigeria and show outright hostility by 
subjecting Nigerians living in their midst to various forms of torture and other humiliation (Ajaebili, 2011). Nigerians in 
Southern African countries, and particularly in South Africa, face a similar fate generally termed as xenophobia (see 
Umezurike and Isike, 2012). This poor perception of Nigerians in the international community could be blamed on the 
unscrupulous political leadership and economic breakdown which the country has experienced for several years owing to 
the opportunities squandered by the successive military regimes in the country. 
In 1993, South Africa’s apartheid hero and ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, published a detailed exposition of the 
philosophical pillars that support South Africa’s foreign policy. According to him they include: 
a. that issues of human rights are central to South Africa’s international relations and  extend beyond the political 
to economic, social and environmental issues; 
b. that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only be achieved through the promotion of 
democracy in the world; 
c. that considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between South Africa 
and other nations in the world; 
d. that peace is the goal for which South Africa and all nations should strive, and where this fails, internationally 
agreed but non-violent methods, including effective arms control regimes, must be employed; 
e. that the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in South Africa’s foreign policy. 
f. that the economic development of South Africa depends on growing regional and international economic 
cooperation in an interdependent world. 
However, the concept of African Renaissance comprises a philosophy which calls on African people and nations to 
overcome the current challenges confronting the continent. The concept was popularized by former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki during his term of office as Deputy President and subsequently President. As such, it has been 
an essential ingredient of the post-apartheid South African intellectual agenda which has continued to shape South 
Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa. In April 1997 Mbeki articulated the elements that comprise the African Renaissance 
to include, among other things, social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding and growth, and the establishment of 
Africa as a significant player in the geopolitical affairs of the world. Among other numerous objectives, the African 
Renaissance is a philosophical and political movement which intends to eradicate the violence, elitism, corruption, 
poverty and  general underdevelopment that has engulfed the African continent, and ultimately replace them with a more 
just and equitable order. Mbeki proposes doing this by, among other things, encouraging education and the reversal of 
the brain drain of African intellectuals. He also urges Africans (led by African intellectuals) to take pride in their heritage, 
and to take charge of their lives. Some scholars have argued that the African Renaissance is equivalent to the Pan-
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Africanism project which seeks to unite Africa (see Zeleza, 2009). 
However, the big question here is: how does South Africa fare in terms of moving from theory to practice of 
implementing the spirit and vision of the African Renaissance in terms of her foreign policy in Africa? Since the advent of 
democracy in South Africa in 1994, which marked the end of South Africa’s isolation from the rest of the world, she has 
established her presence and influence in a number of ways, especially in Africa. The notable spheres in which South 
Africa has played major roles in Africa include sport, economics and political leadership. In sport, South Africa emerged 
from isolation in 1994 to host the first ever FIFA-organized World Cup on African soil (see Ndlovu, 2010). In economics 
South Africa has demonstrated that it has the most sophisticated capitalist economy in Africa in terms of trade, debt and 
foreign investments in Africa and beyond (Mahao, 2006; Tjemolane, 2011; Alden and Soko, 2005; Nicole, 2004). In terms 
of political leadership, South Africa has emerged as a regional and continental power in peacekeeping and negotiation in 
conflict areas such as the DRC, Burundi, Angola, Lesotho, Sudan and Zimbabwe (see Spence, 2004; Habib & Selinyane, 
2004; Wannenburg, 2004; Ngubentombi, 2004). But to what extent do all this promote cooperation between Nigeria and 
South Africa? 
 
3.1 Big Brother Nigeria and Neo-Imperialist South Africa 
 
According to Campbell (2006), Nigeria staged the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) 
in 1977. Campbell used the festival to examine the many problems standing in the way of Nigeria's move toward new 
leadership in the present century. According to him, FESTAC, in fact, revealed a society drifting in the wrong direction. 
The organizers claimed that the festival was an arena for bringing together peoples of African descent to exhibit and 
celebrate their shared heritage. Another claim was that it was aimed at exploiting Nigeria's newly attained economic 
strength and muscle for political advantage on the global scene. But all hopes were soon dashed away because of ethnic 
and regional division and corruption in the country. According to Campbell, FESTAC was an avenue for looting money. It 
amounted to big waste in a society in urgent need of economic reform and political revival. It was also a story of grand 
betrayal and exploitation of the weak, the vulnerable, and the defenceless, orchestrated in large measure in collusion with 
Western industrial capital Campbell (2006). Such big brother roles as Nigeria had embarked upon, which signified lack of 
direction in her economic and political leadership, had seen the international respectability of Nigeria diminish remarkably 
in recent years. 
Nigeria was a frontline state in support of liberation movements in Southern Africa because of her commitment to 
what she considered a just struggle for freedom in the region. For this end Nigeria established the big brother project of 
the Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) (see Aremu, 2013). This was specially funded with deductions from the salary 
of every Nigerian worker, irrespective of rank, both in the public and private sectors as well as donations from ordinary 
Nigerians in all walks of life, including students (see Aremu, 2013). This fund was made available to the liberation 
movements in Southern Africa. Nigeria further provided scholarships for students from South Africa. Nigerian artists also 
contributed in this struggle. For instance, Nigerian musicians waxed albums in support of the anti-apartheid struggle. A 
memorable one in this respect was Sonny Okosun's timeless piece, ‘Fire in Soweto’.  At the international level, Nigeria 
provided leadership at the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union). For example, 
Nigeria chaired the UN Special Committee against Apartheid (UNSCAA) for most of its existence (see Aremu, 2013). 
Nigeria also championed the isolation of apartheid South Africa until that country’s freedom in the 1990s. In sport, Nigeria 
engineered boycotts and the isolation of South Africa because of apartheid (see Banjo and Omidiran, 2000)  
South Africa at freedom in 1994 on the other hand, engaged in an African Renaissance that saw her expand her 
neo-imperial interests in Africa. For example, South Africa’s economic dominance in Africa is demonstrated through her 
production of approximately 80% of Southern Africa’s GDP. A lopsided trade relationship exists between South Africa and 
her neighbours, with South Africa having a surplus advantage over fellow SADC members. South Africa’s estimated 
economic output is US$160 billion, far more than that of the other 13 SADC member states, which jointly produce only 
about US$33 billion (Alden and Soko, 2005). South Africa has also emerged as the largest foreign investor in Southern 
Africa. South Africa’s direct investment in the 13 SADC countries has been estimated to be over US$5.4 billion by 2000. 
According to Alden and Soko, (2005) in 2001, South Africa’s investment in Southern Africa is estimated to have 
amounted to R14.8 billion (US$20 million) by South African Airways (SAA) for its stake in Air Tanzania; US$6 billion by 
Eskom Enterprises in the Inga project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); US$56 million by Sun International in 
its hotel in Zambia; US$142 million by Vodacom in Tanzania, and an additional US$139 million investment in the DRC; 
US$53 million by Pretoria Portland Zimbabwe in merger activity in Zimbabwe; a US$860 million investment by BHP 
Billiton, the IDC and Mitsubishi in the development of the Mozal aluminium smelter in Mozambique; and a further 
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investment of US$1.1 billion by Sasol in the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique (Alden and Soko, 2005). 
South Africa’s total trade with the rest of the continent is heavily skewed in her favour. South Africa’s exports to 
Africa, mostly manufactured goods, increased from U$1.3 billion in 1994 to US$5.9 billion in 2003, while imports from 
Africa to South Africa increased from a low base of US$0.4 billion to US$1.2 billion during the same period (Alden and 
Soko, 2005).  
South Africa’s economic dominance in Africa has seen growth in trade and investment between the two biggest 
economies in the continent, South Africa and Nigeria, with South Africa taking the lead. Both countries are also Africa’s 
major regional powers in economics and politics. Nigeria has become South Africa’s biggest trade partner in West Africa 
and her third largest on the African continent after Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This compares poorly with a relatively 
weak balance of trade for Nigeria with South Africa. South Africa’s economic foray into Nigeria has been encouraged at 
the highest political level, even though most firms have entered the country under their own umbrella through the Nigeria-
South Africa Chamber of Commerce. Aremu (2013) reported that South Africa paraded an estimated gross domestic 
product (GDP) of $368 billion in 2011 as Africa's biggest economy, while Nigeria, Africa's second biggest economy by 
GDP, recorded some $232 billion. Nigeria has regrettably been pushed back to de-industrialization with just less than 4 
per cent manufacturing value added to GDP, while South Africa, as the leading industrializing nation in Africa, parades 
the highest manufacturing value added number of 24 per cent 
In the past decade, over 100 South African companies, with the support of the Department of Trade and Industry, 
have penetrated the Nigerian market in different economic sectors.  Several South African companies now operate in 
Nigeria. These include: MTN, Eskom Nigeria, South African Airways, Stanbic Merchant Bank Nigeria Ltd., Multichoice 
Nigeria/M-Net,Umgeni Water, Defresh Products Nigeria Ltd., South Africa-Nigeria Communications and Systems Ltd., 
Grinaker-LTA Construction Ltd. ,Protea Hotels, Critical Rescue International, Global Outdoor Semces, Oracle Airtime 
Sales, and Digital Satellite Television. Only a handful of Nigerian companies have set up business in South Africa. These 
include Union Bank, First Bank, Philips Consulting, News Media, Financial Standard and This Day Newspapers (Adebajo, 
2007; Zeleza, 2009; Aremu, 2013). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Nigeria at independence pursued a clear policy of decolonization, and eradication of racism in Africa. She also pursued 
big brother projects like the sponsorship of liberation movements in Africa and the FASTAC 1977. But evidence shows 
that largely because of lack of economic and political leadership, the foreign policy of almighty Nigeria became stranded 
and confused at the time South Africa was freed from apartheid. Nigeria is willing to partner with South Africa on political 
and economic bases.  But Nigeria’s leadership is not willing to standby and be embarrassed because of its internal 
weakness. The weakness is mostly the result of political instability, lack of sound economic direction, and endemic 
political and economic corruption in the country. 
South Africa, on the other hand, at democratization in 1994 felt disappointed that Nigeria, that should have been 
providing leadership and leading by example in Africa, was still under military rule and experiencing gross human right 
abuse, all of which South Africa later converted to her advantage. South Africa pursues a foreign policy of a better South 
Africa, a better Africa and a better world. However, her leaders popularized the African Renaissance which she is using 
as an umbrella to expand her business treks in the continent. South Africa has the capacity that is required to lead Africa 
from poverty to prosperity which Nigeria lacks. However, she is able but unwilling to provide the economic leadership 
similar to the political leadership Nigeria provided during decolonization in Africa and apartheid in South Africa. For 
example, South Africa has allowed xenophobia to damage her human rights standing and international respectability. 
Unfortunately this highly damaging hostility is directed against African foreigners residing in South Africa. 
The diplomatic feuds between Nigeria and South Africa occur largely because of the differences in their attitudes in 
terms of African need. It could be said that Nigeria is willing to lead Africa in any direction, but cannot do so right now, 
especially in economics; while South Africa is able but certainly unwilling to make any sort of sacrifice to Africa. Africa is 
doomed in the 21st century if the continent has to rely on the axis of Nigeria and South Africa. The hegemony of Nigeria 
and South Africa is not workable at this stage. For both countries to form hegemony for African prosperity, Nigeria needs 
to be more competitive in the world economy in order to create parity between her and South Africa for peaceful purposes 
that support the cause of it relations with South Africa. Such parity will accelerate Nigeria’s development and like manner 
open up space for respect from South Africa in its relations with Nigeria.   
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